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Endogenous growth theory has recently originated in economics.   Building on 
this theory, this chapter conceptualizes the phenomenon of endogenous growth in terms 
of some new ideas developed in the field of international business (IB). These ideas have 
so far been not linked to the notion of endogenous growth.  On the other hand, 
mainstream economics has not made much progress in exploring the MNC-government 
relationships through which growth-inducing “mechanics” are created, a topic of great 
importance and research in the IB-related discipline.  Both MNCs and governments 
complement each other in facilitating an efficient matching of ownership-specific assets 
(notably knowledge) with location-specific advantages, thereby enabling the developing 
host countries to realize potential growth in an intensified manner, a new mode of 
endogenous growth that counteracts the law of diminishing returns.  The phenomenon of 
MNC-cum-government-driven endogenous growth is thus conceptualized. 
                
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Endogenous growth theory (or also called the “New Growth Theory”) (inter alia, Arrow 
1962; Romer 1986; Lucas 1988; Grossman and Helpman 1991) has recently revitalized the field 
of economic development.  This new growth theory treats a number of growth-inducing factors, 
such as “learning by doing,” “human capital formation via education and training,” “R&D,” 
“public goods and infrastructure,” and “ knowledge spillovers,” as endogenous variables.  All 
these growth factors are related to the generation and flows of knowledge.  Knowledge is self-
augmenting and its use is characterized by the law of increasing returns.  As Alfred Marshall 
observed, “the part of nature in production may show a tendency to diminishing 
returns, but the part of man shows a tendency to increasing returns...  Knowledge is our most 
powerful engine of production: it enables us to subdue nature and satisfy our wants” (Marshall 
1930, as cited in Meier 1999).   Knowledge thus helps us overcome the forces of diminishing 
returns.    Hence long-term vigorous growth becomes a possibility. 
 
Multinational corporations (MNCs) are widely recognized as a crucial catalytic 
institution, which creates and transfers knowledge across borders (both intentionally and 
unintentionally)--and are generally welcomed as such--in the developing host economies.
1  The 
literature on international business (IB) is full of fascinating ideas and conceptual analyses, as 
this paper demonstrates, about  the roles of MNCs and governments in knowledge creation and 
dissemination and their impact on local economic development.  Nevertheless, there has so far 
been no attempt to link these ideas to the notion of endogenous growth.   On the other hand, the 
mainstream economic (neoclassical in origin) literature on endogenous growth has not yet drawn 
on any of these new exciting ideas introduced in the IB literature.  For that matter, it has not yet 
explored the dynamic interactions between MNCs and government policies for economic growth 
as closely as the IB discipline has done.  Indeed, the MNC-government nexus is a topic of central 
importance for IB scholars.  True, some mainstream works on endogenous growth (e.g., 
Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Eicher and Kalaitzidakis, 1997) have explored this topic, but 
have done so only within the straightjacket (mathematical formalization) of neoclassical analysis. 
In such a constrained approach, MNCs are  not adequately portrayed as an institutional agent of 
dynamic growth and change, interacting with host governments’ development policies. 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the MNC-government nexus and derive policy 
implications to the catch-up process of developing host countries.   Hence, IB ideas are explored 
                                                 
 
1Just to cite a few notable examples of policy studies that specifically treat MNCs as an 
instrument of development.  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 
has been actively studying the role of MNCs in economic development.  See its annual World 
Investment Reports (especially1992, 1995 and 1999).  The impact of globalization with stepped-
up MNC activities on economic development is the focus of a conference volume (Hood and 
Young 2000).  How Central Europe is making use of inward FDI in its transition to a capitalist-
path of development and growth is detailed, for example,  in a collection of papers (Hunya 
2000).  in comparison with mainstream theory.  Here, John Dunning’s contributions, especially the 
eclectic paradigm of international production (1981) and his notion of macro-organization (1992, 
1997), provide the necessary foundations to construct a conceptual framework.   The following 
section first briefly reviews the “mechanics”of endogenous growth introduced in mainstream 
economics and then identifies and discusses some relevant works in the IB field, the works that 
present the new mechanics of enhanced growth.  MNC-cum-government-driven endogenous 
growth will be conceptualized as a frame of reference.     
   
II.  CONCEPTUAL EXPOSITION 
II. A.  Mainstream Economic Approach 
 
As summarized in Table l (A), those growth factors that have so far been identified by the 
proponents of the theory of endogenous growth in the mainstream economic literature include: 
(a) learning-by-doing, (b) skills of workers, (c) human capital formation (education and training), 
(d) research and development (R&D), (e) knowledge spillovers, both at home and across borders,  
(f) infrastructure and public goods, and (g) trade liberalization/deregulation.
2   Interestingly, the 
first five elements, (a) through (e), are directly related in one way or another to the knowledge-
related activities of MNCs.  Indeed, mainstream economics began to examine the link between 
FDI and knowledge spillovers in a traditional endogenous growth model (for example, De Mello, 
1997, 1999).  As detailed below, investment in R&D and knowledge spillover (d and e) in 
particular are further explored in the IB literature. 
 
Infrastructure and liberalization (f and g) belong to the domain of government tasks and 
responsibilities.  A large part of human capital formation (notably basic education and public 
health) is also carried out by the government.  Thus both MNCs and governments need to be 
recognized as the crucial facilitators (institutions) of endogenous growth.   In fact, the recent 
popularity of the new growth theory as opposed to the “old” growth theory (which predicts a 
path of growth convergence among countries) derives partly from the fact that because of wide 
disparities in growth rates among countries, “peoples are interested in knowing the implications 
of different government policies on growth...  The more practical implication of these models 
was that the government has a role in economic growth” (Long and Wong 1997: 64, emphases 
added).
3  (See Table 1) 
  
Yet surprisingly–or rather expectedly from its rather narrow disciplinary orientation, the 
                                                 
 
2This list is not meant to be exhaustive.  There are many ancillary ideas such as 
horizontal and vertical innovations.  
 
3For the origins of the new growth theory, see Romer (1994).  Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
(1995) emphasized the role of government in promoting viable long-term growth: “if we can 
learn about government policy options that have even small effects on the long-run growth rate, 
then we can contribute much more to improvements in standards of living than has been 
provided by the entire history of macroeconomic analysis of counter-cyclical policy and fine-
tuning.” 
  2 
 two key institutions, MNCs and governments, that can facilitate endogenous growth--and 
particularly their interactions and synergies in joint production of created assets--have so far not 
adequately been examined in mainstream economics; in fact, it leaves these two key institutions 
of endogenous growth unlinked and their strategic relations unexplored.  In contrast, the IB 
discipline has recently witnessed the emergence of some interesting ideas about, and analyses of, 
the critical role of MNC-government relations in promoting rapid growth.  The IB scholars are 
squarely focused on the role of MNCs as a business institution, which serves as an organizer of 
globalized production networks. 
 
II.B.  International Business Related Approach 
 
So, what are these ideas of the IB genre?  We can identify seven major ones.  As shown 
in Table 1 (B), (a) technology transfer and spillovers by MNCs and their networks, (b) dynamic 
evolution of OLI configuration pari passu with economic growth, (c) cross-border technological 
development and sourcing, (d) cumulative causation in technological competitiveness, (e) 
locational agglomeration of innovative activities, (f) pro-trade (as opposed to anti-trade) FDI, 
and (g) industrial restructuring and comparative advantage recycling in a regionalized context.  
All these “mechanics” in IB facilitate the continuous expansion of business activities in the 
world economy by restraining the law of diminishing returns–hence, endogenously driven 
growth. 
 
What follows will highlight the nature of each of these IB-based sources of endogenous 
growth.  
 
(a) technology transfer and spillovers by MNCs and their networks:  
 
One of the keys to endogenous growth is technology transfer and knowledge spillovers.  
John Dunning (1958) examined both the direct knowledge transfers and spillovers of American 
multinationals in British manufacturing industry.  In his seminal theory of MNCs’ overseas 
investment, Stephen Hymer (1960) identified “the flow of business techniques and skilled 
personnel” as a major feature of “the international operations of firms.”  Raymond Vernon 
(1966) introduced the product cycle theory of trade and investment, depicting the investment of 
American firms in less developed countries as the major vehicle of manufacturing technology 
(both product and process) transfer and as the cause of trade reversal (i.e., initial exports turning 
into imports in the mature stage of product cycle).  Vernon (1979) explored the altered pattern of 
innovations and their diffusions in light of geographically dispersed R&D centers. 
 
Focusing on the imperfect nature of the factor markets, Buckley and Casson (1976) 
theorized the efficacy of the MNC as a superior institution to organize production than markets 
(hence stimulating economic growth worldwide), an institution in which knowledge transfers are 
more efficiently executed.  Blomstrom (1989) specifically analyzed the technological spillovers 
  3 associated with inward FDI (in the context of a host economy, Mexico).
4 Kokko (1992) looked at 
how FDI interacts with host country characteristics in producing spillovers.  Kokko and 
Blomstrom (1995) studied the policies to encourage technology inflows through FDI.   Lall 
(1997) similarly examined the host country strategies to promote the upgrading of technology 
advantages by intervening in MNC activities (in the four Asian NIEs).  Bende-Nabende (1999) 
provided an econometric investigation for the ASEAN-5 economies of the impact of FDI and its 
spillover effects on economic growth. 
 
Most recently, Ernst (2000a, 2001) introduced the concept of “global production 
networks (GPN),” a cross-border hierarchical organization which is established by flagship 
multinational corporations and which creates knowledge spillovers to their overseas affiliates 
and suppliers through global outsourcing activities.  An empirical study of the interactions 
between such networks and the growth of Asia’s electronics industry was made in a number of 
essays in Borrus, Ernst, and Haggard (2000).  The GPN model is reminiscent of Hymer’s (1971)  
“corporate headquarters” model of the globalized and hierarchical corporate economy in which, 
as Hymer put it, the benefits of such an economy “trickle down” from “the metropolis to the 
hinterland.”  It also parallels Rugman and D’Cruz’s (1996, 1997) “the five-partners business 
network model” and “the theory of the flagship firm.”  It is structurally related to the model of a 
transnationalized  “commodity chain” introduced by Gereffi (1992) and Gereffi and 
Korzeniewicz (1994).  To the extent that the spread of the globalized corporate economy 
facilitates knowledge dissemination, global economic growth no doubt accelerates, so long as its 
efficiency-enhancing force outweighs its market-control power.  
 
(b) Dynamic evolution of OLI configuration pari passu with economic growth: 
 
Dunning’s eclecticism of the OLI (ownership-, location-, and internalization-specific 
advantages) framework has recently developed into a dynamic evolutionary theory of  
configurations of these triumvirate factors (Dunning 1993;  Narula 1996; Dunning and Narula 
1996; Narula and Dunning, 2000; Torentino 1993;).  Dunning (1991:126) explains how the OLI 
configuration changes over time: 
 
...  At a given moment of time, the pattern of international production represents a 
point on a set of trajectories towards (or, for that matter, away from) the 
internationalization of production by firms.  That trajectory itself is set by the 
continuous and iterative interaction between the OLI configuration over a 
succession of time periods and the strategy of firms in response to these 
configurations, which, in turn, will influence the OLI configuration in subsequent 
time periods. 
 
Following Dunning’s lead, Narula (1996) argues that a firm’s O advantages at a given period of 
time depend on L factors in a previous period, while a country’s L advantages are in turn 
                                                 
 
4Spillovers by outward FDI on domestic employment, exports, and research in Sweden–
and in general terms-- are explored by Blomstrom and Kokko (1994, 1997). 
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 augmented by its ability to capitalize on the O advantages of foreign MNCs in a previous period.  
In short, a virtuous circle emerges between O and L advantages through “continuous and 
iterative interaction.” 
 
Dunning and Narula (1996) and Narula and Dunning (2000) further explore the 
interactions among host-governments’ trade and FDI policies, foreign MNCs’ activities, and the 
development of intellectual capital at large and created assets at firm level–and their growth-
inducing impact on a host country’s ability to “catch up” and join the ranks of advanced 
countries (or otherwise a country’s fate to “fall behind”).  Their analyses are based on the five 
stages of “investment development path (IDP)” through which the configurations of O and L 
factors evolve in a mutually reinforcing manner, exhibiting the path of “net outward investment 
(NOI)” position. 
 
It should be noted that O and L advantages play different roles in endogenous growth 
because of their different characteristics; the former are firm-specific (i.e., of a private-property 
nature) and mobile but are normally transferred on an exclusive basis (i.e., not necessarily 
available to all outsiders), whereas the latter are of a public good nature
5 (equally available to all 
firms in principle) but immobile.  At low levels of development, L-advantages are a more 
important determinant of localized endogenous growth (say, in a particular developing host 
country or region rather than anywhere else) than their O-advantage counterparts.  Yet as 
developing countries catch up and converge with the advanced world, their general L-advantages 
grow similar at high levels of development, and their O-advantages become less home-country-
specific and more industry-specific.  Indeed, the O-advantages are then increasingly derived 
from firm-specific multinationality. 
 
(c) Cross-border technological development and sourcing: 
 
As John Cantwell (1989, 1995, 1999; Cantwell and Janne, 1999) observe, through 
international business operations, MNCs in a high-tech/R&D-based industry are not merely 
involved in technology transfer and knowledge spillovers but more importantly are increasingly 
engaged in new knowledge creation via a cross-border network of R&D facilities.  In fact, this 
trend is accelerating as more and more MNCs in R&D-based industries are involved in overseas 
production of knowledge itself–in addition to overseas production of products and services. 
 
While the above analysis is made largely from a viewpoint of knowledge-outsourcing 
(mostly large) multinational corporations with formal R&D facilities, Ernst (2000b) stresses the 
knowledge-enhancing mechanism on the part of local knowledge-subcontractors, especially 
small and medium firms in a relatively small economy (Taiwan) as a result of  “inter-
organizational knowledge creation.”  Whether examined from outsourcing MNCs’ or from 
subcontracting local firms’ perspective, this new type of international production (i.e., cross-
border intra-network knowledge production) means an acceleration of global knowledge 
                                                 
 
5The “publicness” of L-advantages is, of course, stressed as a key factor of endogenous 
growth in the mainstream approach, as mentioned as “infrastructure and public goods”in Table 1. 
  5 creation.  In other words, the more globalized and interconnected the world economy becomes 
(instead of subdivided and segmented), the greater the chances of border-straddling knowledge 
production–hence the more rapid and lasting the endogenous growth of the world economy. 
 
(d) Cumulative Causation in technological competitiveness: 
 
The cumulative causation (both virtuous and vicious circles) between the technological 
activities of MNCs and the international competitiveness of an open economy may be intensified 
(Cantwell, 1987).  A virtuous circle occurs because inward FDI is likely to be attracted into 
innovative industries caught up in a virtuous circle in the first place, industries with local R&D 
facilities and a rising indigenous technological capacity, and because newly established foreign 
affiliates increase technological dissemination to suppliers and customers and spur local rivals to 
a higher rate of innovation. This virtuous circle is nothing but a powerful engine of MNC-driven 
endogenous growth.  Here, the size of the firm and the size of the market attainable by way of 
expanding multinationality of the firm also give strong micro-economic incentives to innovate, 
because the firm’s enlarged operations across international markets facilitate transfer of 
intangible assets at nominal marginal costs.  
 
On the other hand, a vicious circle may also occur as a result of MNCs’ market power, 
which may drive out local competitors and hinder the technology creation of local suppliers.  As 
Cantwell (1987:134) summarizes, 
 
The overall conclusion to be drawn from the basic model is that, as a long run 
process, an internationally trading industry will gradually become increasingly 
divided into some dynamic and some stagnant production locations.  The former 
will be characterized by a high proportion of research intensive activity and a 
relatively steep technological progress function, the latter by a low proportion of 
research linked production and a comparatively shallow technical progress 
function. 
 
(e) Locational agglomeration of innovative activities: 
 
Cantwell’s analysis thus directly leads to the notion of locational agglomeration of 
innovative activities.  This notion has only recently begun to be explored by IB scholars (inter 
alia, Porter 1990; Dunning 1991, 1996, 1997; Nachum 1999, 2000), although conventional 
economics has long been familiar with it ever since Alfred Marshall (1920) conceptualized an 
“industrial district,” and a revival of interest in it has occurred with a work of Paul Krugman 
(1991).  The IB literature has lately begun to zero in on this important topic.  For example, an 
idea of cluster-based development strategies was discussed in Enright (2000).   The creation of 
competitive advantages by MNCs through geographical agglomeration of innovation with all its 
multifarious aspects is explored in a conference volume (Dunning, 2000) from IB perspectives. 
Ernst (2000) also introduces the “Flagship model of concentrated dispersion,” in which rapid 
cross-border dispersion coexists with agglomeration. IB-related research is expected to step up 
on the dynamics of cluster-based L advantages, which is no doubt a main wellspring of 
endogenous growth. 
  6 
  
It should be cautioned, however, that forces of agglomeration work in both ways, 
positively and negatively.  Diseconomies occur in term of deteriorations in the environment 
(pollution and ecological destruction) and social infrastructure (congestion, crimes, and rising 
housing costs, etc.), and these need to be tackled at policy level to ensure endogenous growth.
6  
This type of diseconomies weighs more heavily as a growth policy constraint in advanced 
countries than in developing countries.     
 
(f) Pro-trade (as opposed to anti-trade) FDI: 
 
Focusing on the trade implications of FDI, a distinction can be made between pro-trade 
and anti-trade types of FDI from a host country’s perspective and in terms of the Ricardian 
doctrine of comparative advantage  (Kojima 1973, 1975; Kojima and Ozawa 1984).  When trade 
induces strong growth, the pro-trade type of FDI is a powerful promoter of comparative 
advantage.  The origination of this idea lies in the recognition that MNCs as organizers of FDI 
are business institutions (as opposed to markets) that can create this macro-economic effect as a 
result of their multinational business operations.   There is no place for MNCs to exist in the 
traditional trade theories which assumes atomistic competition (“firms don’t matter.”) and no 
cross-border factor movement (including FDI and knowledge diffusion).   Therefore, the pro-
/anti-trade FDI model, though based on the neoclassical Heckscher-Ohlin framework, is 
classified here as an IB approach because of its focus on MNCs as s market-transcending 
institution.  
 
The “maximum” growth-inducing effect of trade is based on three key propositions 
(Kojima and Ozawa 1985:135-139): 
 
Proposition I:  Countries gain from trade and maximize their economic welfare 
when they export comparatively advantaged goods and imports comparatively 
disadvantaged goods. 
 
Proposition II: Countries gain even more from expanded trade when superior 
entrepreneurial assets are transferred through FDI (or through non-equity types of 
transactions) from the home countries’ comparatively disadvantaged industries or 
segments in such a way as to improve the efficiency of comparatively advantaged 
(existing as well as potential) industries or segments in the host countries.
7 
                                                 
 
6For a recent theoretical and empirical study on this issue, see, for example, 
Braunerhjelm, et. al. (2000). 
 
7This important second proposition is lacking in Ricardo’s trade model, since he 
intentionally assumed away cross-border factor movement.  Ricardo reasoned that international 
factor movement (including technology) would destroy the basis for trade (i.e., productivity 
differentials) between countries: “...under [the circumstances of higher labor productivity in 
Portugal]...the wine and the cloth should both be made in Portugal,..therefore the capital and 
  7  
Proposition III:  The process of transferring comparative-advantage-augmenting 
assets is facilitated when the home countries are capable of generating new goods 
or industries in which they can continuously renew comparative advantages and 
retain full employment, particularly employment of those resources released from 
comparatively disadvantaged (hence contracting) industries. 
 
These propositions represent a country’s triple pro-trade orientation, which can 
magnifies the growth-enhancing effect of trade.  The first proposition is Ricardo’s pro-trade 
specialization, which is comparative (not absolute) advantage-induced; the second is pro-trade 
asset transfers; and the third is pro-trade structural upgrading (analogous to Schumpeter’s 
“creative destruction” at the macro level).  The third proposition, in particular, is now important, 
since the cost of globalization on domestic employment needs to be minimized; here the 
government is expected to play the role of a facilitator of MNC-triggered structural change via 
human resource development and technology policies (this directly connects to the IB theme of 
the interactive roles of governments and MNCs). 
 
On the other hand, anti-trade FDI (replacement of exports) is most likely to occur, for 
example, when the host countries pursue import-substituting development policies
8, or when 
innovating firms decide to specialize in knowledge creation (R&D) rather than production and 
exporting by quickly transplanting manufacturing overseas, especially in rapidly growing foreign 
markets. 
 
Pro-trade FDI also generates scale and learning economies–in addition to allocative 
efficiency through trade-induced specialization in comparatively advantaged host industries.  
FDI itself (even if it is of the neutral type) brings with it the superior technologies and 
organizational skills hitherto unavailable in the host economies. How the host countries will 
benefit from inward MNC activities, however, depends ultimately on their “social capability” 
(Abramovitz 1986) and  “national technological capabilities” (Lall 1992).  But the host country’s 
capability itself may or may not be enhanced by foreign MNCs’ participation in the domestic 
industries for a variety of reasons (Lall 1999; UNCTAD 1999).  But when the host countries are 
able to capitalize on MNCs’ pro-trade investment in the interest of its structural upgrading, its 
economic growth will be all the more accelerated and prolonged–that is more endogenously 
driven than otherwise.  
 
(g) Industrial restructuring and comparative advantage recycling:   
                                                                                                                                                             
labor of England ... should be removed to Portugal.”  Thus, Ricardo did not see how England’s 
comparative advantage in cloth would be even enhanced if the Portuguese secrets of higher 
productivity in cloth are transferred to England’s comparatively advantaged industry.  See 
Ozawa (1997b). 
 
8If import substitution occurs as part of the long-term process of building up local 
industrial capacity which eventually develops into exporting, the anti-trade nature of FDI is a 
temporary (short-run) phenomenon.  In fact, FDI is generally trade-creating in the long run.  
  8 
  
Closely related to the idea of pro-trade FDI is the use of FDI, both inward and outward, 
as agents of industrial restructuring and upgrading along the lines of dynamic comparative 
advantage (Ozawa 1992, 1993).  Supergrowth (a success case of endogenous growth in its 
ultimate form) thus becomes a possibility, especially for outward-looking, export-oriented 
economies with MNC-friendly development policies.
9  Moreover, when a regionally clustered 
group of countries which are at staggered stages of economic development adopt the similarly 
outward-focused strategies of development simultaneously, such a region becomes a dynamo of 
economic development, as has been evidenced in East Asia.
10   A proper alignment of countries 
along the different stages of industrialization, along with stability in foreign exchange rates, 
creates an ideal set of conditions for comparative advantage recycling (Ozawa, 1993).  For 
example, labor-intensive manufacturing (such as apparel, toys, and standardized electronics 
goods such as radios, TV sets, microwave ovens, and key boards) has been quickly shifted first 
from Japan to the NIEs, then from the NIEs to ASEAN-4, and most recently from these Asian 
countries to China, creating the job-creating, wage-boosting, and growth-inducing effects of FDI 
in each successive round of comparative advantage recycling and generating a “tandem 
development multiplier” effect. 
 
This analysis actually constitutes an extension (restatement) of the so-called “flying-
geese” theory of economic development (Akamatsu, 1935, 1961; Kojima, 1958) in terms of the 
role of multinationals as the augmenters and recyclers of trade advantages (Ozawa 1993, 1996, 
1997b).
11  Comparative advantage recycling is thus a powerful mechanism of endogenous 
growth. 
 
II.C.  Focus on MNC-Government Interactions 
 
It is now clear that the IB literature has produced some analytically fascinating ideas 
which can constitute the critical “mechanics” of endogenous growth and which are equal in 
explanatory power and supplementary to those identified in the mainstream economic literature. 
One major strength of IB, compared with the traditional branch of economics, is that it is focused 
                                                 
 
9A developing country’s strong outward orientation is certainly not without drawbacks, as 
has been seen in the recent Asian crisis, especially when its financial sector is opened to foreign 
banks, portfolio investors and currency speculators.  This is discussed below. 
 
10Indeed, one key question raised in the New Growth Theory is: “Why have countries, or 
groups of countries, been able to grow for decades in succession with no apparent tendency to 
slow down, despite rising capital-labor ratios?” (Boltho and Holtham 1992).  Most recently, such 
successful growth did occur in East Asia, which was, in fact, once identified as “the East Asian 
miracle” (World Bank 1993). 
 
11Both Dunning’s IDP theory and the reformulated “flying-geese” paradigm are the 
stages models of FDI-driven economic development.  For discussions on their interrelatedness, 
see Ozawa (1996) and van Hoesel (1997).    
  9 squarely on the relationships between MNCs and the host governments charged with the task of 
promoting domestic economic growth.   And in fact, this focus makes IB distinctly different 
from conventional economics (especially, traditional international economics).   In the words of 
Robert Grosse and Jack Behrman (1992: 93): 
 
International business has existed as a distinct field of study for the past three 
decades, but it does not have a widely accepted explanatory theory on which to 
base its uniqueness as a discipline...  Since international business is the study of 
business activities that cross national borders and, therefore, is fundamentally 
concerned with the firms that undertake that business and the national 
Governments that regulate them, a theory that is unique to such business must 
explain the responses of businesses to government policies and the policy-making 
of Governments themselves towards international firms (emphases added).       
 
They insist that “any theory of international business must be a theory of policies and 
activities of business and Governments, in conflict and cooperation” and that “a theory of 
international business should explain how the issues of government concerned with TNC 
activities are defined, how they are negotiated, what trade-offs are involved, how differences are 
resolved, what adjustments are made over time and why” (p.97).  Consequently, Grosse and 
Behrman (1992) introduce a bargaining theory, which explains how MNCs and host 
governments come to terms by trading off their “relative bargaining resources” and “relative 
stakes” within the range of “similarity of interests.” 
 
What this chapter is concerned with is, however, not the bargaining process per se, nor 
how the two parties arrive at an agreement or end up sharing the spoils of MNCs’ operations.  
Our primary focus is beyond the bargaining and settlement stage; it is on the possible macro-
organizational (a la Dunning) developmental impact of both MNCs’ operations and the host 
governments’ policies toward trade and FDI on the process of local economic growth and 
change. 
 
Dunning’s eclectic paradigm has the well-known triumvirate conditions that a firm must 
meet if it is to invest and produce abroad: (1) the possession of net O advantages vis-à-vis firms 
of other nationalities in serving particular markets; (2) it should be more profitable to use O 
advantages within its hierarchy (i.e., to “internalize”), and (3) it must be in the interests of the 
firm to utilize these advantages in conjunction with at least some factor inputs outside its home 
country (Dunning, 1988: 25-26).  And it is this third condition that directly leads to the arena of 
interactions through international business operations between MNCs as seekers of foreign factor 
inputs and markets and host governments as managers of host-specific location factors.  Here, O 
advantages need to be matched and effectively linked up with some L advantages or assets of the 
host economy.  There are, however, a number of political economy issues in the “new 
diplomacy” of bargaining between foreign firms and host governments (Stopford and Strange 
1991).  Both benefits and costs need to be thrashed out and managed when developing host 
countries intervene in investment promotion, domestic-content requirements, export-
performance requirements, and technology transfers for local economic development (Moran 
1998).  
 
-10- It is this focus on the MNC-government interface that makes the IB approach distinct 
from mainstream economics and places the former in a more advanced state of understanding 
about the dynamics of endogenous growth and its policy implications for catch-up development.   
In addition to this key difference, the latter is devoted to “formal theorizing,” while the former is 
oriented to “appreciative theorizing”–to borrow Nelson and Winter’s (1982) classification of 
theorizing.  Furthermore, mainstream economics is somewhat “reductionist “ and “deeply 
specialized,” while IB is more “holistic” and interdisciplinary in analysis–and more directly 
policy relevant.  Needless to say, however, these two approaches are complementary with each 
other, although the IB literature unfortunately remains unorthodox to–and largely neglected by--
mainstream economics.  
 
II. D.  MNC-cum-Government-Driven Endogenous Growth 
 
By combining all the ideas of the IB genre reviewed above into a unitized frame of 
reference, we can thus develop what may be called “MNC-cum-government-driven endogenous 
growth.”  This framework should become the hallmark of the IB theory of endogenous growth. 
 
As stipulated in Dunning’s eclectic paradigm, O advantages or firm-specific intangible 
assets (such as product and process technologies, and managerial and marketing skills) are 
possessed and controlled by MNCs, while L factors--inputs (such as labor, natural resources, and 
industrial infrastructure), local markets (demand conditions), and the general economic 
ambience–are all under the purview, and in the bailiwick, of the host government. 
 
It is, therefore, worth stressing that an act of “internalization” (setting up and running a 
subsidiary)–and especially how efficiently and how effectively (hence how profitably) 
internalization is carried out--is actually not a one-sided act on the part of MNCs alone.  
Internalization efficiency is obviously affected by the host government’s management and 
control of L factors, as well as by the quality of participation of local interests in MNCs’ 
ventures as partners (in the case of joint ventures, which are often strongly promoted by the host 
country as a measure to build its national industrial capacity).  In other words, a process of 
internalization needs to be examined from both MNCs’ and host countries’ points of view; 
involving “MNC-side internalization” and “host-side internalization.” (Ozawa 1997c).  By host-
side internalization is meant that the host government tries to maximize and retain within its own 
economy as much as possible all the direct and indirect benefits of foreign MNC activities, 
which accrue from their effective combinations with existing L factors.
12  To this end, the 
government must create the “right” type of L advantages suitable for the “right” type of foreign 
MNCs and their activities at the “right” stage of economic development (Narula and Dunning 
2000), the L advantages appropriate for the prevailing factor endowment and technological 
                                                 
 
12Here, government active involvement toward inward FDI is postulated.  If the host 
government adopts a hands-off policy leaving economic coordination to market forces, no 
internalization efforts are made by the government, as is usually the case with advanced 
countries (notably the United States, although its state and local governments are engaged in 
capturing the benefits of inward FDI with incentives). 
 
-11- conditions.  Thus the government’s ability to do so basically determines national competitiveness 
and economic growth.  It should be noted, however, that the present trend toward globalization 
has tilted the balance of power in favor of MNCs (Dunning 1997).  
 
This two-sided process of internalization is likely to contribute to FDI-led locational 
agglomerations--another cause of endogenous growth.  Since the host governments’ abilities to 
capitalize on and make use of MNC activities differ, divergent growth paths and rates will entail. 
 
There are, however, some costs of this type of outward-dependent process of growth.  
One cost is the inevitable weakening of “nationhood” (Gray 1999), and some may even resurrect 
the ghost of the “dependency” theory of development.  But here lies the key role of government 
in maximizing the benefits of MNC-based growth and minimizing its costs.  In this respect, the 
capability of government (national governance) itself increasingly becomes a key locational asset 
(an endogenous factor) in its own right, given the current trend of globalization.
13  
 
III. SUMMING UP        
 
In this chapter some new ideas developed in the IB-related field are linked to the notion 
of endogenous growth, contrasting with, and supplementing, the mainstream economic analyses.  
And what may be called “MNC-cum-government driven endogenous growth” is stressed as the 
core of the IB-related approach.  MNCs and governments play the critical roles in facilitating the 
efficient matching of firm-specific assets with location-specific advantages so as to produce a 
vigorous and enduring business expansion in the local economy. They (in collaboration with 
local industry) are the chief co-drivers of endogenous growth by turning development constraints 
(L factors) into both new business opportunities (opportunities for O advantages to be 
appropriated and reinforced) and growth augmentation (in which L advantages are appropriated 
as part of GDP), which can counteract the law of diminishing returns–all within Dunning’s 
eclectic paradigm.  Moreover, endogenous growth can be enhanced even further within an intra-
regional hierarchy of economies where a new form of dynamic industrial agglomeration comes 
into existence via MNC-networks of knowledge generation and commercialization, via cross-
border networks of production and procurement, and via inter-development-stage recycling of 
dynamic comparative (and competitive) advantages.  The “international business” paradigm of 
endogenous growth presented in this chapter draws heavily on the macro-organizational model 
of MNC-government interactions (i.e., the interface between the O and L factors) as the vital 
factor in continuous and rapid economic development.  Development and growth in the age of 
globalization are increasingly becoming IB-driven endogenous growth within the key framework 
for interactions (“joint internalization”) between MNCs (possessors of O advantages) and host 
governments (managers of L advantages)–that is, co-endogenization of advantages for vigorous 
business expansion and economic growth. 
 
                                                 
 
13True, the mainstream approach also stresses human capital formation, investment in 
R&D, and infrastructure and public goods.  But these are not framed in terms of MNC-
government interactions. 
 
-12- Table 1.     Basic Mechanics of Endogenous Growth 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
A.  Mainstream Economic Approach 
 
a)  Learning by doing (Arrow, 1962) 
b)  Skill level of workers (Uzawa, 1965) 
c)  Human capital formation (Lucas, 1988) 
d)  Investment in R&D (Chipman 1970; Grossman and Helpman 1991) 
e)  Knowledge spillover, both at home and across borders (Romer 1986; Krugman 1979; 
Grossman and Helpman 1991) 
f)  Infrastructure and public goods (Barro 1990; Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995; Turnovsky 
1997) 
g)  Trade liberalization and deregulation (Rivera-Batiz and Romer 1991)   
 
B.  International Business Related Approach 
 
a.  Technology transfer and spillovers by MNCs and their networks (Dunning 1958, 1981; 
Hymer 1960, 1971; Vernon 1966, 1979; Blomstrom 1989; Bende-Nabende 1999; Ernst 
2000a, 2001; Borrus, Ernst and Haggard 2000; Rugman and D’Cruz 1996, 1997; Gereffi 
1992; Gereffi and Korzeniewicz 1994) 
b.  Dynamic evolution of OLI configuration (Dunning 1993; Dunning and Narula 1996; 
Narula 1996; Narula and Dunning 2000; Tolentino 1993) 
c.  Cross-border technological development and sourcing (Lall 1979; Casson 1991; Cantwell 
1989, 1995,1999; Pearce 1997; Ernst 2000b) 
d.  Cumulative causation in technological competitiveness (Cantwell 1987) 
e.  Locational agglomeration of innovative activities and production (Porter 1990; Dunning 
1991, 1996, 1997, 2000; Nachum 1999, 2000; Enright 2000, Ernst 2000a) 
f.  Pro-trade (as opposed to anti-trade) FDI (Kojima 1973, 1975; Kojima and Ozawa 1985) 
g.  Industrial restructuring and comparative advantage recycling (Ozawa 1992, 1993) 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Note: Here a complete survey on conceptual contributions is not intended.  These two lists are 
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